Technology assessment between risk, uncertainty and ignorance

The use of most if not all technologies is accompanied by negative side effects, While we may profit from today’s technologies, it is most often future generations who bear most risks. Risk analysis therefore becomes a delicate issue, because future risks often cannot be assigned a meaningful occurance probability. This paper argues that technology assessement most often deal with uncertainty and ignorance rather than risk when we include future generations into our ethical, political or juridal thinking. This has serious implications as probabilistic decision approaches are not applicable anymore. I contend that a virtue ethical approach in which dianoetic virtues play a central role may supplement a welfare based ethics in order to overcome the difficulties in dealing with uncertainty and ignorance in technology assessement

Order out of Chaos? A Case Study in High Energy Physics

In recent years, computational sciences such as computational hydrodynamics or computational field theory have supplemented theoretical and experimental investigations in many scientific fields. Often, there is a seemingly fruitful overlap between theory, experiment, and numerics. The computational sciences are highly dynamic and seem a fairly successful endeavor---at least if success is measured in terms of publications or engineering applications. However, for theories, success in application and correctness are two very different things; and just the same may hold for "methodologies" like computer simulations. A lively debate on the epistemic status of computer simulations has thus emerged within the philosophy of science. This paper discusses possible problems when computer simulation and laboratory experiment are intertwined. In present experiments, stochastic methods in the form of Monte Carlo simulations are often involved in generating experimental data. It is questioned as to how far a realistic stance can be maintained when such stochastic elements are involved. Taking experiments in high energy physics as a study case, this paper contends that using these types of entangled material and numerical experiments as a source of new phenomena or for theory testing must presuppose a certain understanding of causality and thus binds us at least to a weak form of realism

Why Affordable Clean Energy Is Not Enough. A Capability Perspective on the Sustainable Development Goals

This paper reflects on criticisms raised in the literature on the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These have been criticized as creating a dichotomy between the environment and human beings that fails to address the multiple interconnections between the two. This paper focuses on SDG7—“affordable and clean energy”—and suggests that there is in fact a tripartite distinction between the environment, human beings and technology underlying the SDGs. This distinction, we argue, does not adequately represent the multiple interconnections among the various SDGs and hampers their implementation. We contend that the formulation of SDG7 produces a circular definition of sustainability, a difficulty that is currently resolved at the level of the targets and indicators in a way that regards energy technologies primarily as artifacts. By contrast, the literature on ethical aspects of energy systems largely agrees that energy is a paradigmatic example of a sociotechnical system. We contend that, by not considering this sociotechnical nature, the SDGs run the risk of implicitly defending a certain variant of technological optimism and determinism. We argue that this is disadvantageous to the environment, human well-being and technological development. In line with recent critical evaluations of the SDGs, we argue that these (and other) shortcomings can be addressed by better connecting the SDGs to human well-being. Building on recent literature that expands the scope of the Capability Approach as an alternative measure of well-being so as to include considerations of sustainability, we articulate a framework that allows us to elucidate this connection and thus to take advantage of synergies between human well-being and the environment. On the basis of the Capability Approach, we argue that equating sustainable energy with renewable energy—as is done in the transition from SDG7’s goal to its targets—is indefensible because, as part of the overarching energy systems, energy technologies cannot be classified as simply right or wrong. Rather, the indicators and targets within a framework focused on sustainability need to be (more) context sensitive, meaning that, among other things, they may vary by country and with the available technology

Epistemic Uncertainties in Climate Predictions: A Challenge for Practical Decision Making

Most scientists agree that, at least for the time being, unquantified uncertainties are inevitably connected to predictions of climate models. Uncertainties, however, do not justify political inaction. This paper addresses the question of how epistemic uncertainties are of relevance for practical decision making. It is shown how common decision approaches based on the precautionary principle fail to adequately deal with uncertainties as they arise in climate modeling. I argue that with regards to climate change, unquantified uncertainties can neither be ignored in decision making nor be reduced to quantified ones by assigning subjective probabilities. This distinguishes the ethical problems associated with climate change from other problems regarding energy supply and demand like, for example, those associated with nuclear power

Probing the Improbable: Methodological Challenges for Risks with Low Probabilities and High Stakes

Some risks have extremely high stakes. For example, a worldwide pandemic or asteroid impact could potentially kill more than a billion people. Comfortingly, scientific calculations often put very low probabilities on the occurrence of such catastrophes. In this paper, we argue that there are important new methodological problems which arise when assessing global catastrophic risks and we focus on a problem regarding probability estimation. When an expert provides a calculation of the probability of an outcome, they are really providing the probability of the outcome occurring, given that their argument is watertight. However, their argument may fail for a number of reasons such as a flaw in the underlying theory, a flaw in the modeling of the problem, or a mistake in the calculations. If the probability estimate given by an argument is dwarfed by the chance that the argument itself is flawed, then the estimate is suspect. We develop this idea formally, explaining how it differs from the related distinctions of model and parameter uncertainty. Using the risk estimates from the Large Hadron Collider as a test case, we show how serious the problem can be when it comes to catastrophic risks and how best to address it

Models in Engineering Design as Decision-Making Aids

Although models and modeling are central to engineering design, they have received much less attention than models or modeling in the philosophy of science. This paper draws on insights from the philosophical literature on models in science to elucidate models in engineering. Many of the apparent differences are a matter of degree. Models in engineering design do not function solely as representational or more general epistemic vehicles. Rather, models are central to facilitating decision making. This seems to be less pronounced in laboratory practices for scientific research than in engineering design. In engineering, often only the designers understand and determine the relation between the model and its target system. In this, they serve as truth makers and truth keepers. This social process of design is essential to understanding the role of models and modeling from a meta perspective, but is also relevant to engineer when models are reused. A better understanding of these roles can help to illuminate the roles of models in engineering. To illustrate these points, this paper uses the design of a 3D printed kayak as an example that shows how even a fairly modest engineering design project requires the creation of a multitude of different models

Unsicherheiten in der Klimavorhersage als Herausforderung für die Entscheidungstheorie

"Unter Klimatologen besteht weitgehend Einigkeit, dass Vorhersagen von Klimamodellen unausweichlich unsicher sind. Unsicherheit rechtfertigt aber keineswegs politische Inaktivität. In diesem Aufsatz wird deshalb diskutiert, in wieweit epistemische Unsicherheiten für die praktische Entscheidungsfindung von Relevanz sind. Insbesondere soll gezeigt werden, dass das Vorsorgeprinzip nicht in der Lage ist, den spezifischen Unsicherheiten, wie sie in Klimaprognosen auftreten, gerecht zu werden. Nichtquantifizierte Unsicherheiten dürfen in Entscheidungsfindungsprozessen weder ignoriert werden, noch lassen sie sich durch Einführung subjektiver Wahrscheinlichkeiten auf quantifizierte Unsicherheiten reduzieren. Dies unterscheidet die ethischen Aspekte des Klimawandels wesentlich von anderen ethischen Problemen aus dem Bereich der Energieversorgung." (Autorenreferat

Epistemic Uncertainties in Climate Predictions: A Challenge for Practical Decision Making

Most scientists agree that, at least for the time being, unquantified uncertainties are inevitably connected to predictions of climate models. Uncertainties, however, do not justify political inaction. This paper addresses the question of how epistemic uncertainties are of relevance for practical decision making. It is shown how common decision approaches based on the precautionary principle fail to adequately deal with uncertainties as they arise in climate modeling. I argue that with regards to climate change, unquantified uncertainties can neither be ignored in decision making nor be reduced to quantified ones by assigning subjective probabilities. This distinguishes the ethical problems associated with climate change from other problems regarding energy supply and demand like, for example, those associated with nuclear power

Von einer dritten empirischen Wende in der Technikethik. Ein Plädoyer für ein Mehr an Technikethik in der Ingenieurausbildung

1. Einleitung Die Bedeutung der Technikethik ist in der zweiten Hälfte des vergangenen Jahrhunderts stark gewachsen. Grund hierfür ist die gesteigerte Verfügungsmacht über die außermenschliche wie menschliche Natur, die uns moderne Technik an die Hand gibt, und die weitreichende Implikationen nicht nur für uns und unsere Umwelt heute, sondern auch in Zukunft beinhaltet.. Die heutigen neuen oder gar emerging technologies wie Gentechnik, climate engineering, neuro-enhancement, synthetische Biol..